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ABSTRACT 
The union membership in the United States has declined 
since 1970 and reached less than 14 percent of labor force 
in 1989. A number of studies have been conducted to examine 
the causes of decline in union membership. Among researchers 
nearly all believed that structural change in the United 
States economy plays an important role. The theories of 
managerial opposition and substitution of government and 
employers for unions were also supported by many 
researchers. This study examined the effect of the number of 
female and part-time workers from the labor force as a 
measure for structural change in the economy. The number of 
unfair labor practice filed by the union members was used to 
show the effect of managerial opposition. For indicating the 
effect of governmental substitution, the number of workers 
that received unemployment insurance from government were 
chosen. In addition, direct foreign investment as a proxy 
for foreign competition and a dummy variable for political 
party of the president to show the administration and 
legislation effect were used. 
Three multiple regressions were performed, using data 
from 1961-1989. Data were obtained from Economic Report of 
President, Statistical Abstract of the ·united States, and 
Monthly Labor Review. In the first regression model the 
absolute value of the independent variables were used. The 
results showed that only the absolute values of part-time 
workers and the president's political party have negative 
and significant effects on the percentage of unionized 
workers to the labor force. The effect of percentage change 
of the independent variables on the percentage of unionized 
workers in labor force is shown in the results of the second 
regression model. The results imply that there is a negative 
but not significant relationship of percentage of female and 
part-time workers to labor force and the president's 
political party with the dependent variable. There is also a 
significant effect of direct foreign investment in the 
United States and the insured unemployed to unemployment 
ratio on the dependent variable. Because of the high degree 
of intercorrelation between the percentage of female and 
part-time workers to total labor force the third regression 
model was run without the variable of part-time workers. The 
results showed a negative and significant effect of 
percentage female workers to labor force on the percentage 
of unionized workers to labor force. In addition, percentage 
change of direct foreign investment and the number of 
insured unemployed divided by total unemployment have 
positive and significant effect on the percentage of the 
unionized workers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Unions are the principal institution of workers in 
modern capitalistic societies. For over 200 years since the 
days of Adam Smith, economists have studied the social and 
political effects of unionism. In addition, numerous studies 
have been conducted on the factors which may have an effect 
on unions' bargaining power. 
Generally, it is important to gain a basic 
understanding of the origin of labor unions. One historical 
view is that unions are essentially the off spring of 
industrialization. That is, most preindustrial workers were 
self-sufficient in that they were simultaneously employ~rs 
and employees (Campbell & Brue, 1992). Industrialization 
changed this system and made many workers dependent upon 
factory owners for employment and income. Competitive 
pressure in the pr~duct market of ten forced employers to pay 
low wages to employees, work them long and hard, provide 
minimal job benefits, and terminate their employment when 
market demand for their product decreased. In short, 
industrialization forced workers into a position where their 
earnings, working condition, and security were beyond their 
control as individuals. As a result, in order to protect 
their interests workers formed unions to bargain 
collectively with employers. 
Unions become more and more strong in the sense that 
they achieve favorable bargaining settlements with 
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employers. The unions' main concerns are to raise wages for 
their members, maintain job security, deal with work 
allocation, deal with employee turn over, and fringe 
benefits (i.e, life insurance, major medical benefits, and 
paid vacation). Moreover, they may have an important role in 
society. For example, a host of protective legislation, 
including unemployment insurance, employment discrimination, 
and employment safety and health laws are to be credited to 
unions (Fiorito & Maranto, 1987, p. 16-17). 
Despite the fact that unions contribute so much to 
workers, their percentage of the labor force who are members 
has declined. According to Fiorito (1987, p. 12), actually 
union membership has continued to grow throughout most of 
-±he past 30 years, but at a slower rate than of employment 
growth. During the past several years, however, union 
membership actually has declined. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to gain an understanding 
of the state of unions in the United States. In particular, 
to identify causes of the recent decline of union membership 
in the United States from 1961 to 1989. Before the mid-1950s 
the union membership was rising and reached a high of 26 
percent of labor force as shown in Table 1, but since then 
it has fallen to 14 percent of labor force in 1989 (Campbell 
& Brue, 1992, p. 231). This study identifies and explains 
some of the factors which might have contributed to union 
membership decline. 
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The effects of administration and legislation, 
structural change, managerial opposition, and the 
substitution hypothesis are accepted by majority of 
researchers. In addition, union internal factors, ideology 
and values (Fiorito & Maranto, 1986, p. 14), and decline in 
demand for union representation among non-union workers 
(Farber, 1989) can also be considered. According to Freeman 
(1986), the union wage differential is another cause for 
decline in union membership. He further elaborates that wage 
increase cause reduction in profits and thus are a minus to 
management. Edward and Swaim (1983), in their study have 
pointed out some other factors such as import competition, 
deregulation, high unemployment, and the tightening 
constraints of labor laws. 
Year 
Table 1 
Union Membership in the United States 
Selected Years (1900-1989) 
Union Membership 
(1000s) 
Percentage of 
Labor Force 
-------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------
1900 
1910 
1920 
1930 
1940 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1985 
1989 
791 
2,116 
5,036 
3,632 
7,282 
14,823 
18,117 
21,248 
22,366 
16,996 
16,960 
3 
6 
12 
7 
13 
23 
25 
26 
21 
15 
14 
--------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------
Note. From Contemporary Labor Economics (p.231) 
by c. R. McConnell and s. L. Brue, 1992, 
NewYork: McGraw-Hill. 
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ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS OF DECLINING 
UNION MEMBERSHIP 
Many studies have been published concerning the cause 
of recent decline of union membership in the United States 
for the past 30 to 35 years. The decline has been examined 
as union density (Neuman & Rissman, 1984), relative change 
in number of members (Stepina & Fiorito, 1986), union win 
rates in certification (Seeber & Cook, 1983), and union 
organizing effort (Voos, 1983). Several studies have 
summarized the results of hundreds of empirical analyses. 
Among them the following could be cited: 1) Administration 
and legislation (Freeman, 1988), 2) Change in economic 
structure (Farber, 1987), 3) Managerial opposition 
(McConnell & Brue, 1992), 4) Union substitutability by 
employers and government which cause decline in demand for 
union representation among nonunion workers (Farber, 1989), 
5) Union internal factors (Fiorito & Maranto, 1986), 6) 
Import competition (Farber, 1989),and 7) Deregulation 
(Edward & Swaim, 1983). 
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Administration and Legislation 
Labor relations laws and regulations have some 
influence on the unionism in the United States. But unions 
in order to win legislation and pass their favorable bills 
must have enough congressional votes. As a result unions 
became politically active and seek to influence the 
political market in several ways: 
1) By propagandizing their members to vote in particular 
ways. 
2) By spending unions funds for low-income unregistered 
persons, to encourage them to register and vote. 
3) By contributing to pro-union candidates. Generally~ 
labor was the leading contributor. to P.oli "t::ica.l campaigns, 
but business has become the major contributor. For example, 
in 1980 labor gave $13.1 million (24 percent) of the $55.3 
million total Political.Action Committee (PAC) 
contributions. 
4) By allocating union resources, including staff-time, 
and volunteer efforts to campaigns. 
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For the union political effort to be effective the 
union-aided candidates have to win a reasonable proportion 
of congressional seats. The history shows that union-favored 
legislation has done well when the Democrats are in power 
but poorly when Republicans are in power. For example as 
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) reports show, labor won 78 percent 
of bills from 1965 to 1968, when Lyndon Johnson was 
president, compared with 49 percent from 1969 to 1972 whep 
Richard Nixon was president. But because a bill favored by 
unions is passed by congress does not mean that union 
political power caused its passage. 
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On the other hand the bills passed by congress have a 
significant effect on the union membership and their 
bargaining power. According to McConnell & Brue (1992, p. 
314), prior to 1930s, union organizers and members were 
legally unprotected against employers or even government. So 
the rise and fall of union membership during this period of 
time are due to reasons other than legislation and 
administrAtion .. For .example there is a sharp rise in union 
membership that occured during the labor scarcity period 
from 1917 to 1920. Then there was a reduction from about 5 
million to around- 4 million during the deep depression of 
1920-21. Later another decline in membership occured from 
1929 to 1933 during the great depression from 3.4 million to 
3 million (Troy, 1962). 
During the 1930s, the union membership increase was 
generally attributed to pro-union legislation. Several laws 
were passed by Congress which placed a protective umbrella 
over the union activities. 
The Norris LaGuardia Act of 1932, invalidated the 
yellow-dog contracts. These contracts required employees to 
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agree as a condition of continued employment, not to join a 
union. This Act also reduced the personal cost of becoming a 
union member. Previously, the costs of joining a union might 
be the loss of one's job. Also, the Act made it difficult 
for employers to obtain injunctions against union activity. 
So the unions' activities increased, 'such as strikes which 
in turn caused employers offer higher wages. These higher 
offers in turn, increased the incentive for workers to 
become union members. 
The Wagner Act of 1935, had even greater impact on 
union membership. This legislation guaranteed unions the 
right to self- organization, free of interference from 
employers, and the right to bargain with employers. The· act 
also listed a number of "unfair labor practices" on the part 
of management, and established the National Labor Relation 
Boar~ (NLRB), which was given the authority to investigate 
unfair labor practices occurring under the Act. The Wagner 
Act enabled the American Federation of Labor (AFL) to 
increase its power and also permitted the rapid growth of 
industrial unions connected with the Congress of Industrial 
Organization (CIO). The CIO unions organized millions of 
less-skilled workers employed in mass-production industries 
such as: steel, rubber, and automobiles. When the AFL and 
the CIO merged in 1955, union membership in the two 
organization had risen to about 17 million. The AFL-CIO 
plays an important role in political action in elections and 
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lobbying (McConnell & Brue, 1992, p. 227). 
During 1940s and 1950s, the employment in previously 
unionized manufacturing plants increased. This growing 
strength of labor unions produced some difficulties for 
employers. For example Teamsters engaged second boycotts in 
which the union workers refused to make deliveries to non-
union establishments or to accept transfers of freight from 
non-union carriers. So to avoid this, employers forced their 
workers to join the Teamsters. These kinds of problems led 
Congress to pass the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. This 
legislation contained some rules concerning "unfair labor 
practices" on the part of unions. It prohibited: Coercion of 
employees to become union members, Secondary boycotts 
(refusing to buy or handle products produced by another 
union or group of workers), Sympathy strikes (work stoppage 
by one union designed to assist some other union in gaining 
employer recognition or· some other objective), Excessive 
union dues, and Featherbedding (forcing payment for work not 
actually performed). These rules were intended to reduce 
some of the excessive union power. 
Union membership continued to grow slowly, until the 
1980 decline (see Table 1). According to Freeman (1988, p. 
78), Reagan administration's actions may have contributed to 
the acceleration of the decline since 1970s. He also pointed 
to one of the popular administration actions in the period 
of the Reagan presidency. In reaction to the Professional 
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Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike 
President Reagan fired all of the striking controllers. This 
in turn caused an antiunion climate in the business 
community. 
Structural Change 
The distribution of employment in a number of 
dimensions has changed which could account for unionization 
decline. Farber (1987, p. 916), presented change in the 
economy by comparing the data of the years 1950,1977 and 
1984. First, the fraction of civilian female employment, who 
have historically been less unionized, increased from 29.4% 
in 1950 to 40.5% in 1970 to 43.7% in 1984. Second, the 
regional employment has shifted away from the historically 
heavily unionized Northeast and North regions and toward the 
historically less.unionized South. In 1950, 24.7% of the 
nonagricultural labor force was in the South, and this 
increased to 33% by 1984. Next, labor force shifted away 
from heavily unionized blue-collar employment toward less 
heavily unionized white-collar employment. In 1950 the 
fraction of the labor force that was in blue-collar 
employment was 40.5% and this fell to 34.4% by 1977. 
Finally, the industrial composition of employment shifted 
away from the traditionally heavily unionized manufacturing 
and other goods-producing industries and toward the less 
heavily unionized service industries. In 1950 the fraction 
of the nonagricultural labor force that was in service-
producing industries was 59.1% and this rose to 70.5% by 
1977 and to 74.0% by 1984 (Farber, 1987, p. 916). 
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In supporting the theory of shifting employment to the 
southern regions Reder (1957) showed that after 1945, the 
growth of low wage nonunion firms in southern areas may have 
been assisted by a provision of the Taft-Hartley Act of 
1947. Taft-Hartley Act made invalid, in any state 
proscribing them, collective bargaining agreements requiring 
union membership as a condition of employment (Right to work 
laws). 
In recent years, employment growth has been provided by 
. _ sma J J -.£irms which according to a number of studies_, are less 
likely to be unionized than are large firms. Even and 
Macp~erson (1990), have estimated that declining plant size 
accounted for 28 percent of the decline in unionism over the 
1979-1983. 
Another recent structural change in the United States 
economy is the deregulation of some key heavily unionized 
industries such as trucking, airlines, communication and 
transportation. These industries have become much more 
competitive since the government removed entry barriers and 
rate regulation. In this more competitive environment firms 
are likely to resist unionization more than in the past 
because their market position is no longer protected by the 
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government (Farber, 1987, p. 920). 
Among the economists who agreed on the structural 
change hypothesis are Fiorito & Maranto (1987) and Freeman 
(1988). Troy (1990), also took the same position in an 
article entitled, "Is the United States Unique in the 
Decline of Private Sector Unionism?" He argued that the 
United States has led Canada and Europe in the substitution 
of "High Tech" manufacturing (such as computer equipment, 
semi conductors, and radio and television communication 
equipment) for traditional manufacturing (such as steel and 
automobiles). The result is that, in the United States there 
has been an enormous substitution of nonunion white-collar 
jobs for union blue-collar jobs as the structural change 
hypothesis would suggest. However, he believes that 
structural changes in labor markets began sooner, proceed~d 
more rapidly, and their scope was more extensive in the 
United States than.in Canada and Western Europe. In union 
terms, the nonunion labor market grew sooner and much more 
rapidly in the United States than in Canada and Western 
Europe.. Generally, he agrees with structural changes 
hypothesis, and argues that structural change which have 
occured in Canada and Western Europe have differed from 
those in the United States Europe in both timing and 
effectiveness. 
There is some opposition to the structural change 
hypothesis. As McConnell and Brue (1992, p. 223), pointed 
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out there are other advanced capitalistic countries which 
have experienced structural changes similar to those which 
have occured in the United States. The unionization movement 
in those countries continue to grow both absolutely and 
relatively. Canada is the most important example. 
Structural change could have an important role, but it can 
not fully account for the decline in unionization. 
Managerial Opposition 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) believe that since the 
beginning of 1970's unions have increased the union wage 
advantage, which the nonunion workers enjoyed it as well. 
Meanin_g these wc;ge increases are a minus to management. As a 
result, union firms have become less profitable than 
nonunion firms which in turn has caused managerial 
opposition to unions to increase. This opposition takes a 
variety of forms, both legal and illegal. 
Legal antiunion tactics include: written and verbal 
communications with workers, tactics to delay the NLRB union 
certification election in order to reduce worker enthusiasm 
for unionization, and hiring labor-management consultants 
who specialize in antiunio~ activities which encourage 
workers not to join unions or to persuade union workers to 
decertify their union (Freeman, 1986, p. 93). As shown in 
Table 2, as the percentage of the role of supervision in the 
Table 2 
Unions Success Rate in NLRB Elections 
ROLE OF SUPERVISION IN THE 
CAMPAIGNS (Percent of cases) 
UNION SUCCESS RATE 
(Percent) 
14 
------------------------------------------------------------
None (6) 
Some (8) 
Moderate (18) 
Sizeable (36) 
extreme (51) 
100 
70 
57 
20 
33 
------------------------------------------------------------
Note. From "The Effect of the Union Wage Differential 
on Management Opposition and Union Organizing 
Success" by R. B. Freeman, 1986, American 
Economic Review. p. 93. 
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campaigns or managerial opposition activities increased, the 
union success rate decline. 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) report that there has been. a 
rise in the use of illegal antiunion tactics. In particular, 
they argue that it has become increasingly common for 
management to identify and dismiss leading prounion workers, 
even though this is prohibited by the Wagner Act of 1935. 
This act along with the other rules, prohibits antiunion 
discrimination by employers in hiring, firing, and 
promoting. 
The increasing popularity of this tactic stems from the 
fact that even when proved guilty, the employers receive 
only light penalties. For example, employers who are found 
guilty of firing union workers are forced to reinstate the 
workers and to pay them limited back pay (The wages they . 
would have received minus whatever income they received on 
other jobs), often.several years later. In addition the 
employers must post a notice that they will not engage in 
such illegal activity again. Another reason for the growth 
of illegal management opposition is that it is an 
exceedingly effective way to chill an organizing campaign 
(McConnell & Brue, 1992, p. 233). 
Freeman (1984, p. 234-235) cited thirteen recent 
studies on the impact of management antiunion activities 
upon the outcomes of union elections. He observed that in 
twelve of thirteen studies, management activity reduces 
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union success in NLRB representation election. 
A later study by Freeman (1988) presents two types of of 
regression analyses (see Table 3). First, the time series. 
regression to show the effect of unfair labor practices and 
union wage premium on organizing success for the period of 
1950-1980. For this purpose he chose real GNP, rate of 
inflation, unemployment, and percentage of wage differential 
as independent variables, and the unfair labor practices per 
worker in NLRB election as dependent variable (column 1). 
The result showed that union wage differential had a 
positive sign and is significant. This means that there is a 
positive relationship between union wage differential and 
unfair labor practice. He then add unfair labor practice to 
the list of independent variables and. to~k the number of 
workers organized per employment as the dependent variabl~ 
(col1:1ffin 2). The regression result showed that there is a 
negative relationship between the number of unfair labor 
practices and workers organized per employment. Next he ran 
another regression, taking the percentage wage differentials 
as the. independent variable along with the other independent 
variables. The number of workers organized per employment 
was used as the dependent variable (column 3). The result 
shows a negative relationship between them. In the same 
paper he also estimated the effect of unfair labor practices 
on organizing success in a pooled cross-section industry 
file for the period 1965-80 over which industry data were 
Table 3 
Estimated Effect of Union Wage Premium on 
Unfair Labor Practice on Organization Success 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable 
Log(Unfair Labor 
Practices Per Worker 
in NLRB Election) 
( 1) ( 2) 
Log(Number 
of Workers 
Employment) 
( 3) 
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============================================================ 
Constant 
Time 
Real GNP 
Rate of Inflation 
Unemployment Rate 
Percentage Wage 
Differentials 
Unfair Labor 
Practice 
R-Squared 
-4.3 
0.15 
(0.04) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-1.35 
( 1. 43) 
0~.02 
(0.04) 
2.45 
( 1. 04) 
0.96 
-6.62 
-0.08 
(0.04) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
1.83 
(1.52) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.46 
( 0. 2) 
0.92 
-5.8 
-0.14 
(0.04) 
0.003 
(0.001) 
-2.07 
( 1. 72) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-2.98 
( 1.16) 
0.91 
------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------
Note. From " The Effect of the Union Wage Differential on 
Management Opposition and Union Organizing Success" 
by R. B. Freeman, 1986, American Economic Review. 
p. 95. 
available. So the dependent variable was the number of 
workers won from total employment and the independent 
variables were unfair labor practices per election and 
18 
other variables such as producer price, profit and wages. 
The result of regression showed a sizeable and significantly 
negative impact of management opposition as measured by 
unfair labor practices on union success. 
Substitution Hypothesis 
The union substitution thesis attributes union decline 
to the fact that services provided by the union are 
increasingly provided by employers and government. The 
employer-union substitution thesis argues that through 
various progressive human resource policies, employers have 
"bought off" employee demand for union representation 
(Fiorito & Maranto 1987). The employer union substitution 
hypothesis is supported indirectly by numerous studies of 
researchers. Farber and Saks (1980) found that relatively 
well-paid employees are far less interested in voting for a 
union. Employers, in order to satisfy employees, in addition 
to paying attractive wages, do the following: establish two-
way communication channels with workers, offer seniority 
protection, create worker-participation schemes and pay 
fringe benefits. 
Farber (1989) examined data on worker attitudes toward 
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unions for the time period of 1977 to 1984. He observed that 
workers who are satisfied with their jobs are much less 
likely to vote for union representation than are 
dissatisfied workers. In his research Farber focused on one 
aspect, the trend in demand for union representation among 
nonunion workers. For this purpose he selected the data from 
the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey (QES), survey 
conducted by Lewis Harris and Associates for the AFL-CIO in 
1984, the 1980 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Young men (NLSB), and the 1982 wave of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Young Women (NLSG). These four 
surveys contain responses to a question (called VFU), which 
asked nonunion workers whether he/she would vote for union 
representation on their current job if a secret ballot 
election were held. The response to this question (NO=l, 
YES=9) is interpreted as an indicator of the worker's demand 
for unionization.-All the surveys also contain questions 
regarding job satisfaction and union instrumentality to 
increase wages. Simple tabulations of VFU among nonunion 
worker~ show that 38.6 percent of 663 workers in the QES, 
37.8 percent of 1242 workers in the NLSB, 43.5 percent of 
1339 workers in the NLSG and 33.7 percent of 935 workers in 
the AFL survey would vote for union representation. There is 
no apparent trend, but preferences for union representation 
are likely to be correlated with age, race, sex and year 
that survey was conducted. So he decided to use a linear 
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probability of worker desire for union representation given 
the VFU results. The result showed that there is a 
significant decline in demand for union representation frpm 
1977 to 1984. Actually demand for union representation among 
nonunion workers decline about 4.4 percent. To determine, 
how much of this amount can be accounted for the increase in 
job satisfaction and the decline in perception of union's 
ability to increase wages or to improve jobs Farber (1989) 
examined another model. In this model he took VFU as 
dependent variable and SAT=l if the worker is satisfied with 
job overall, SATPAY=l if the worker is satisfied with job 
security, and UIMPW=l if worker feels that unions improve 
wages and working conditions. The results show all four· 
variables are strongly significant. If .we add all the 
coefficients the result shows that all of the decline in 
demand for union representation among nonunion workers 
between 1977 and 1984 can be accounted for by the increase 
in job satisfaction and decrease in perceptions of union 
instrumentality. So employers activities to provide prounion 
services was successful. 
The government-union substitution thesis argues that 
laws now provide protection once provided by unions. 
Promoting civil rights, minimum wages, and unemployment 
compensation are some of them (Fiorito'& Maranto 1987). 
Neumann and Rissman (1984) also in their empirical analysis 
concluded that government has been responsible for providing 
more "union-like" services which lessened the union 
membership. These services as they mentioned are 
unemployment insurance, social security and health and 
safety laws. 
The Internal Factors 
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The three hypothesis mentioned before do not cover all 
the factors which might be contributing to the decline of 
unionism. For example, there is some evidence to suggest 
that union efforts to organize the unorganized have been 
insufficient (Voos, 1983). Lipset (1986), notes that public 
approval of unionism has declined steadily since the early 
1950s. Lipset, ..by using United States-Canadian comparisons, 
argues that Canadians are more receptive to collective 
action. 
On the other hand, American ideology is a faith in 
laissez-faire, at least as it applies to business. Schneider 
(1981) in his study mentioned that business does some good 
for everyone in society, while unions act primarily to 
benefit their members and leaders and have only a negative 
impact on the rest of the public. Lipset (1986) argued the 
"ideological thesis", but he had no empirical evidence to 
explain how it may affect the decline in unionization. 
Stepina & Fiorito (1986, p. 250) showed that public opinion 
changes in membership, but their results do not support 
Lipset's contention that public approval plays a dominant 
role. 
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Some authors believe that declining union strength may 
be due to internal union factors. Craft & Abboushi (1983) 
found that nearly 75 percent of workers feel that union 
leaders are self-serving and autocratic, and public 
confidence in them is very low. Maranto & Fiorito (1987) 
demonstrated that autocratic features in unions reduce union 
success in certification elections. Freeman & Medoff (1984) 
made evident that corruption among union leaders is as bad 
as among business leaders. 
At present, no evidence exists that the decline in 
union density is due to internal union factors, but research 
in this direction has just begun (Maranto & Fiorito, 1987). 
Import Competition 
Union activity to increase wages, raises the costs of 
production. So it becomes more profitable to import rather 
than producing some products in United States. Because 
higher product prices will not be accepted by consumers who 
have attractive foreign alternatives. According to Farber 
(1989, p.919), some of the increase in imports is likely to 
be due to the unions themselves, as they raise costs of 
production. In 1958 only 2.5% of manufacturing sales in the 
United States were imports. This rose to 7.2% by 1977 and to 
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11% by 1984. In the past, American firms with no significant 
foreign competition, could afford to accommodate higher 
costs associated with labor unions by sharing some of the. 
gains of a relatively closed economy with their workers. 
However, the increased openness of the American economy has 
reduced the gains to be shared and has made it prohibitly 
expensive to bear these higher costs. As a result, unions 
lost some of their effectiveness to raise wages, and this 
has reduced attraction of unions to union members. 
As a result demand for protection from "unfair" foreign 
competition by unions has become a major issue of national 
economic policy (Branson, 1980, p. 189). 
On the other hand the increase of the foreign direct 
_in~e.s.t.ment in the United States have also a negative effect 
on the union membership. Foreign companies are not unionized 
and as the amount of the foreign direct investment increase 
the union membership as a whole decline. 
Deregulation 
Another factor contributing to the decline of union 
membership is deregulation. This means that government 
removed some rules which forbade the activities against 
entry in to the industries. Deregulation increases 
competition and so increase the cost disadvantage of union 
operations. The popular example is transportation 
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industries, notably freight hauling and airlines (Reder 
1975, p.99). Before 1975 regulation of freight rates had 
made it possible to pass forward the cost of union contracts 
to customers without fear of competition from nonunion 
firms. 
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HYPOTHESIS 
The purpose of this study is to identify causes of the 
recent decline of union membership in the United States. 
Some explanations for the contemporary decline in union 
strength have been reviewed. Because of the lack of 
information and data, it was decided to run an empirical 
test using some of the variables noted in the review of 
literature. 
This study intends to show the effect of the number of 
unfair labor practices, the number of female workers, the 
number of part-time workers, the ratio of unemployed insured 
by government divided by total unemployment, foreign direct 
investment in the United States, and the effect of the 
president's political party on the number of unionized 
workers. The variables of unionized workers, female and 
part-time workers, ·unemployed insured workers by government 
can be measured in three ways: 1) As an absolute number, 2) 
The percentage of labor force and, 3) Percentage change in 
absolute number. Unfair labor practices and foreign direct 
investment can also be measured in two ways: 1) As an 
absolute number and, 2) As percentage change in absolute 
number. The President's political party is used as a dummy 
variable, and it is expected to have a positive relationship 
with the dependent variable. As discussed earlier in this 
study, all other independent variables have a negative 
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effect on the strength of unionization. So it is expected 
that the regression will show negative relationship between 
them and the dependent variable. 
METHODOLOGY 
For the formal test of the hypothesis, the study used 
three time series regression analyses for the time period 
from 1961 to 1989. 
The first regression model is as follow: 
UW = a + blABSF + b2ABSPT + b3ABSDI + b4ABSULP + 
b5ABSIU + b6PPP + ei 
UW = Percentage of unionized workers to total labor force. 
ABSF = Absolute number of female workers. 
ABSPT = Absolute number of part-time workers. 
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ABSDI = Absolute amount of foreign direct investment in the 
United States. 
ABSULP = Absolute number of unfair labor practices filed by 
unions. 
ABSIU = Absolute number of insured unemployed by government. 
PPP = Dummy variable of political party of president; X=O 
(If Republican) and X=l (If Democrat). 
The second regression model is as follow: 
uw = a + blF + b2PT + b3DI + b4ULP + b5IU + PPP + ei 
UW = Amount of unionized workers as the percentage of labor 
force. 
F = Percentage of female workers in the total labor force. 
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PT = Percentage of part-time workers in the total labor 
force. 
DI = Percentage change of foreign direct investment in the 
United States. 
ULP = Percentage change of unfair labor practice filed by 
unions. 
IU = Number of insured unemployed paid by government divided 
by total unemployment. 
PPP = Dummy variable of president political party; X=O (If 
Republican) and X=l (If Democrat). 
The third regression model is as follow: 
UW = a + blF + b2DI + b3ULP + b4IU + bSPPP + ei 
The Variables in .:this regression are the same as the second 
regression without the percentage of part-time workers to . 
total labor force (PT). 
Data 
The data (from 1961-1989) for this study were gathered 
from the Economic Report of the President, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, National Labor Relations 
Board Annual Report, and Monthly Labor Review. 
' 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Three time series regression analyses were used to 
determine some of the causes of the recent decline of union 
membership in the United States. The result of first 
regression is shown in Table 4. The Coefficient of 
determination CR-Squared) is 0.9300 which implies that 93% 
of decline in union membership is explained by the 
independent variables. The regression results imply the 
following: 
a) There is not a significant but a positive 
relationship between the absol4te number of female workers 
and percentage of unionized workers. Also there is a 
negative and signi£ic.ant relationship between the absolute 
number of part-time workers and the absolute number of 
unionized workers which support our hypothesis. 
b) The increase in absolute amount of foreign direct 
investment in the United States caused an insignificant 
increase in union membership. 
c) To show the impact of managerial opposition the 
absolute number of unfair labor practice filed by unions 
have been chosen. The result shows a highly significant and 
positive relationship wi_th }:he absolute number of unionized 
workers. The logic behind it might be that as the union 
membership decline, the number of unfair labor practice 
decline with it. 
Table 4 
Results of the First Regression Model 
lt,s // Dependent Variable is UW 
l>ate: 12-03-1993 I Time: 15:35 
IMPL range: 1961 - 1989 
•umber of ~bservations: 29 
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======================================================================== 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG. 
============================================================~~========== 
c 
ABSF 
ABS PT 
ABSDI 
AB SU LP 
ABSIU 
PPP 
32.791052 
1.681E-05 
-0.0017766 
7.855E-06 
0.0003667 
0.0001109 
;..2.5477348 
1.8741756 
0.0003235 
0.0007566 
3.492E-05 
5.848E-05 
0.0004774 
0.5733167 
17.496254 
0.0519581 
-2.3479270 
0.2249765 
6.2706363 
0.2322759 
-4.4438521 
0.0000 
0.9590 
0.0283 
0.8241 
0.0000 
0.8185 
0.0002 
------------------------------------------------------------------------~-----------------------------------------------------------------------I-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.930068 
0.910995 
1.169782 
-41.69125 
. 1.905148 
Hean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F-statistic 
Prob CF-statistic) 
20.78276 
3.921012 
30.10459 
48.76493 
0.000000 
=======================================================================~ 
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d) In order to show the substitutability effect, 
absolute number of insured unemployed have been chosen. The 
result shows a positive and not significant relationship 
between number of covered workers and the absolute number of 
unionized workers, which does not support our hypothesis. 
The reason might be because unemployment insurance payment 
by the government is a small portion of the large 
governmental payments, so it can not be a good proxy for the 
regression model. The positive relationship may exist, 
because both of the variables were declining in the past 30 
years. 
e) The result shows a very significant effect of 
president political party on union membership., It was 
expected that during the Republican presidency union 
membership would decline and the negative sign of 
coefficient supports this hypothesis. 
The Durbin-Watson stat of 1.90 shows that there is not 
an·autocorrelation problem. This problem occurs when 
significant explanatory variables are not included in the 
regression equation or if a non-linear relationship exist. 
Another reason may be because the randomness of error term 
is violated which means that the error term in one year is 
somehow related to the error term in the previous year. 
Multicollinearity problem occurs when there is a high 
degree of intercorrelation among some or all of the 
explanatory variables in the regression equation. This can 
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be checked for by running COVA on the TSP program and 
checking the correlation among the independent variables. In 
this study there appears to be a high degree of correlatipn 
between absolute number of female workers with absolute 
number of part-time workers and foreign direct investment. 
To correct this problem it might either change the 
combination of variables, using a proxy for one of the 
variables, or using a greater number of observations. 
The results of the second regression (see Table 5), 
shows that only percentage of female workers and part-time 
workers to total labor force, and president political party 
have negative relationship with the percentage of unionized 
workers. Other independent variables have positive 
relationship with de_pendent variable which .. reject our 
hypothesis. The T-stat values shows that only percentage 
chan~e in foreign direct investment and insured unemployed 
to total unemployment are statistically significant at 5% 
level of confidence. 
Because of the high degree of intercorrelation between 
the percentage of female workers to total labor force and 
percentage of part-time workers to total labor force (see 
Table 6), it was decided to run the third regression. The 
variables in this regression are same as the variables which 
were used in the second regression except the percentage of 
Table 5 
Results of Second Regression Model 
LS II Dependent Variable is UW 
Date: 12-03-1993 I Time: 15:41 
SMPL range: 1961 - 1989 
Number of observations: 29 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG. 
~----------------------------------------------------------------------­
------------------------------------------------------------------------c 
F 
PT 
DI 
ULP 
IU 
PPP 
27.815958 
~0.4569048 
-0.0065864 
0.0204016 
0.0300786 
23.854362 
-0.2423724 
8.3962229 
0.3405038 
0.7075388 
0.0073938 
0.0806162 
7.4226494 
0.9745195 
3.3129132 
-1.3418495 
-0.0093089 
. 2.7592684 
0.3731088 
3.2137260 
-0.2487096 
0 .. 0032 
0.1933 
0.9927 
- 0.0114 
0.7126 
0.0040 
0.8059 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-WatsQn stat 
0.800273 
0.745802 
1.976898 
-56.90788 
0.848917 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-sta~istic) 
20.78276 
3.921012 
85.97876 
14.69172 
0-.000001 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-----------------------------------------------------------
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Table 6 
Covariance Results of the Second Regression Model 
Date: 12-03-1993 / Time: 15:44 
SMPL range: 1961 - 1989 
Number of observations: 29 
======================================================================== Variable · Mean S.D. Maximum Minimum 
======================================================================== 
uw 20.782759 3.9210120 25.700000 13.700000 
F 39.606896 3.8240716 45.100000 33.500000 
PT 15.465517 1.6793442 18.300000 12.400000 
DI 40.044828 57.169051 195.00000 -45.300000 
ULP 2.0079310 ·6.1934773 11.100000 -18.750000 
IU 0.4354828 0.0842651 0.6350000 0.2990000 
PPP 0.4137931 0.5012300 1.0000000 0.0000000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------Covariance Correlation 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------UW,UW 
UW,F 
UW,PT 
UW,DI 
UW,.ULP 
UW,IU 
UW,PPP 
F,F 
F,PT 
F,DI 
F,ULP 
F,IU 
F,PPP 
PT,PT 
PT,DI 
PT,ULP 
PT,IU 
PT,PPP 
DI,DI 
DI,ULP 
DI,IU 
DI ,PPP 
ULP,ULP 
ULP,IU 
ULP,PPP 
IU,IU 
IU,PPP 
PPP,PPP 
14.844186 
-10.961606 
-4.0;)68015 
44.470423 
.. 13.621999 
0.2380531 
0.6243758 
14.119264 
5.7067898 
6.2565993 
-11.006815 
-0.1898344 
-1.0683711 
2.7229486 
-4.3167318 
-4.7265182 
-Q.0553247 
-0.4891795 
3155.6004 
69.986338 
, -0.8601974 
-5.5116528 
37.036431 
0.2600520 
0.7567182 
0.0068558 
0.0118002 
0.2425684 
1.0000000 
-0.7571640 
-0.6380957 
0.2054717 
0.5809625 
0.7462214 
0.3290416 
l.0000000 
0.9203778 
0.0296409 
-0.4813279 
-0.6101558 
-0.5772966 
1.0000000 
:..o.0465687 
-0.4706597 
-0.4049221 
-0.6019098 
1.0000000 
0.2047188 
-0.1849393 
-0.1992158 
1.0000000 
0.5160808 
0.2524658 
1.0000000 
0.2893648 
1.0000000 
======================================================================== 
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part-time workers to total labor force. 
The result of this regression (see Table 7), shows that 
the variable of female workers is significant as expected .• 
There is also a negative relationship between female workers 
and unionized workers which support the structural change 
hypothesis. Besides, the percentage change of foreign direct 
investment and insured unemployed to total unemployment are 
significant and have positive relationship with percentage 
of unionized workers. The percentage change of unfair labor 
practice turned out to have a positive but significant 
effect on the percentage of unionized workers. President's 
political party as expected has a negative relationship with 
the dependent variable but is insignificant. 
The results of Durbin-Watson statistics in the both 
second and third regressions show an autocorrelation 
problem. 
Table 7 
Results of the Third Regression Model 
LS // Dr:;?endent \rariable is vw 
Date: 12-03-1993 / Time: 15:51 
SMPL range: 1961 1989 
Number of observations: 29 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG. 
====================================================================~=== 
c 27.841079 7.7760029 3.5803843 0.0016 
F -0.4597479 0.1472387 -3.1224653 0.0048 
DI 0.0204053 0.0072206 2.8260020 0.0096 
ULP 0.0302807 0.0759306 0.3987949 0-.6937 
IU I ~3.818194 6.1855567 3.8506144 0.0008 
PPP -Q.2403976 0.9302461 -0.2584237 "o'. 7984 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.800272 
0.756853 
1.933448 
-56.90794 
0.849611 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F-statistic 
· Prob(F-statistic) 
.20. 78276 
"3.921012 
85.97910 
18.43135 
0.000000 
======================================================================== 
37 
CONCLUSIONS 
Unions have mainly two important functions, which ar~ 
to organize the unorganized labor and negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements. In the United States unionized sector 
is the minority component of the labor force. Most recently 
this amount started to decline and reached 14 percent of the 
civilian labor force. 
In this study some of the causes of the recent decline 
in union membership in the United States were discussed. 
Among the hypothesized causes which were proposed by the 
majority of researchers the following were tested. The 
effect of percentage of female workers to total labor force, 
percentage of part-time workers to total labor force as the 
measure for structural change in the composition of work 
force. In addition, percentage change in foreign direct 
investment in the.United States was used to show the effect 
of foreign competition on unionization. Percentage change in 
unfair labor practices filed by unions was chosen as one 
type of evidence of increasing managerial opposition. 
Insured unemployed to total unemployment was used to examine 
the effect of governmental substitution on the union 
membership. Finally, the president's political party was 
used to show the administration's and legislation's effects 
on percentage of unionized workers to total labor force. 
Three regression models using the percentage of 
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unionized workers as dependent variable were tested. The 
first regression used all the independent variables in 
absolute terms, and the result suggest that only absolute. 
number of part-time workers and president political party 
have negative effect on the percentage of unionized workers. 
The second regression used independent variables as the 
percentage amount, and dependent variable, as the percentage 
of unionized workers. The results showed the negative effect 
of percentage of female workers to total labor force, 
percentage of part-time workers to total labor force and 
president political party on the dependent variable. 
Because of the high degree of intercorrelation between 
the two variables of female and part-time workers in the 
second regression, it was decided to run the third 
regression. The variables in this regression are similar to 
the ones which were used in the second regression except for 
the percentage of· part-time workers. The results show a 
negative effect of percentage of female workers to total 
labor force on the percentage of unionized workers. So by 
removi~g one variable the multicollinearity problem is 
removed. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
The regression model will be significant and the least 
squares would be an efficient procedure for estimating 
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coefficient of the regression model if there were no 
problem. In this study results of the three regression 
models showed some insignificant variables, and also some of 
them rejected our hypothesis. So this study can not be a 
good determination for the decline in union membership in 
the United States. Therefore further research is necessary 
before any exact conclusion is made. 
It is suggested to use new variables which might have 
significant effects such as: union and nonunion wage 
differentials, and rate of inflation. Region, type of 
industry, and job satisfaction can also be used as dummy 
variables. 
It may also be possible to utilize the data from 
different industries and run a cross-sectional regression 
analysis which could produce a more significant result. 
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